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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most of us would consider a state’s discrimination against its 
citizens—say, by refusing to hire them on account of their sex, race, 
religion, or ethnicity—clearly unjust, something in urgent need of 
rectification.  Yet we often take a less censorious view of discriminatory 
acts by private individuals who choose not to share their neighborhood 
with, associate with, trade with, work with, befriend, marry, or be buried 
in the same graveyards as people of a different sex, race, religion, or 
ethnicity.  On reflection, this asymmetry is puzzling.1  It cannot be 
explained by saying that state discrimination has graver consequences 
involving more people than private discrimination.  True, considered on 
their own, private discriminatory acts often have negligible consequences; 
but together such acts often form patterns that are no less consequential 
than, say, the passing of a piece of discriminatory legislation.  We need a 
better understanding of the morality of private discrimination.2
Part II offers both an account of private discrimination and an 
overview of its subvarieties.  Parts III through V review two accounts 
of the moral unacceptability of private discrimination: the desert-
accommodating, prioritarian account and the respect-based account.  Part 
IV supports the first of these, and Part V challenges the second.  Finally, 
addressing the issue from the perspective of the desert-accommodating 
prioritarian account, Part VI asks when, morally speaking, there ought to 
be a legal right to engage in private discrimination.  The approach to private 
discrimination is consequentialist, because it holds discrimination to be 
 1. See MATT CAVANAGH, AGAINST EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 169 (2002). 
 2. I do not mean to imply that we have a firm grasp of the nature and badness of 
non-private discrimination.  My focus here, however, is on private discrimination, albeit 
on the view I propose, basically, that there is no intrinsically morally relevant difference 
between private and non-private discrimination. 
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bad in virtue of its bad consequences, and egalitarian, because it holds 
the badness of these consequences to be greater the worse off the 
negatively affected individuals are. 
II.  PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION DEFINED 
We are all familiar with lists of victims of discrimination.  Yet few of 
us would be able to define discrimination with any real exactitude.  This 
unfortunately means that we have no explicit criteria for determining 
when to delete items from, or add items to, the well-known lists.  It also 
means that it is hard to tell why and, hence, when discrimination is 
morally wrong.  Clearly, until we know which non-moral properties make 
acts discriminatory we will be unable to say which of these properties 
make discrimination morally wrong. 
In one sense, discriminating against people is more or less equivalent 
to differentiating them in a way that harms some of them or displays a 
preference for some over others.  In another sense, to discriminate against 
people is to act in a morally impermissible way.3  The former sense is 
obviously very broad.  Not only does discrimination in this sense have 
no automatic condemnatory force, but there is also no prima facie reason 
to think that someone who discriminates in this very broad sense acts in 
a way that is morally worse than someone who does not.  In fact, to 
discriminate in this sense is something we can hardly avoid.4
Discrimination in the latter sense is an inescapably evaluative term; 
accordingly, its descriptive content will have to be much narrower than it 
is in the first sense.  If we use the term in this second sense, we cannot 
meaningfully ask: “Are all kinds of discrimination unjust and morally 
unjustified?”  Yet many scholars have asked this question.5  An intermediate 
sense of discrimination must be captured in order to make room for this 
 3. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Message of Affirmative Action, in THE AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION DEBATE 169, 174 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1995). 
 4. This is the sense of discrimination at work when “refus[ing] to sit next to 
people who haven’t bathed recently” is offered as an example of pretty harmless 
discrimination.  Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  
Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992).  I 
owe several other examples of discrimination in the broadest sense appearing in this 
section to Professor Alexander.  See id. at 158-96. 
 5. See, e.g., CAVANAGH, supra note 1, at 153; JAN NARVESON, MORAL MATTERS 
306-25 (2d ed. 1999); JAN NARVESON, Have We a Right to Nondiscrimination?, in 
RESPECTING PERSONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 203 (2002); Peter Singer, Is Racial 
Discrimination Arbitrary?, 8 PHILOSOPHIA 185 (1978). 




question—a sense which, on the one hand, is not inescapably evaluative 
but, on the other hand, is much narrower than discrimination in the first 
sense indicated above: 
X discriminates against (or in favor of) Y if: (i) X treats Y differently from Z (or 
from how X would treat Z, were X to treat Z in some way); (ii) the differential 
treatment is (or is believed by X to be) disadvantageous (advantageous) to Y; 
and (iii) the differential treatment is suitably explained by Y’s and Z’s being (or 
being believed by X to be) (members of) different socially salient groups.6
The following fills out the elements of this formula. 
A.  Variables 
The variables X, Y, and Z range over individuals, groups of individuals, 
and super-individuals.  Private discrimination includes just those forms 
of discrimination where X ranges over agents, such as employers, sellers 
or service providers, lovers, friends, clubs, and so on, whose relevant 
discriminatory activities are, in some suitable sense, independent of the 
state. 
B.  Disadvantageous Treatment 
X’s differential treatment of Y and Z is (believed by X to be) 
disadvantageous to Y if and only if (X believes that) Y will benefit less 
from or be harmed more than Z as a result of the differential treatment.  
The relevant disadvantage is interpersonal, not intrapersonal.  Hence, my 
definition of discrimination implies that an act of discrimination against 
Y may improve Y’s situation relative to the way it was prior to the 
discriminatory act and relative to how it would have been had the 
discriminatory act not taken place, and be believed by X to do both.  This 
seems right.  If a privately funded aid agency declares that it will devote 
most, but not all, of its resources to help male, middle-aged, Protestant 
white people, few would deny that it discriminates on the ground that it 
harms no one in either of the intrapersonal senses of harm employed just 
above. 
C.  Discrimination Against Versus Discrimination in Favor 
It is only when someone is treated in what is, or is believed by the 
agent to be, a disadvantageous way that we speak of discrimination 
against.  The reverse point applies to favorable discrimination.  My 
 6. Any act of discrimination involves a particular dimension in which the 
discrimination takes place.  Often, the dimensions in which discrimination takes place 
vary across groups.  See Alexander, supra note 4, at 158. 
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formula allows that the disadvantage involved in discriminatory treatment 
may be actual but unforeseen by the discriminator or nonexistent but 
believed to exist by the discriminator.  The latter possibility must be 
allowed so as to accommodate failed attempts to favor one over another.  
The former must be allowed because, according to many observers, this 
is the most common form discrimination takes. 
D.  Species of Discrimination 
X can treat Y and Z differently in innumerable ways.  Hence, there are 
many different species of discrimination.  These species include direct 
and indirect discrimination, and cognitive and noncognitive discrimination.  
Cognitive and noncognitive discrimination may be brute or valuation-
based, which in turn can be divided into hierarchical and nonhierarchical 
forms. 
Direct discrimination is differential treatment that involves representing 
those who are subjected to discrimination as belonging to the relevant 
socially salient group, membership of which explains the differential 
treatment.  An employer who prefers not to hire women for top 
managerial posts and, accordingly, ignores female applicants is involved 
in direct discrimination.  An employer who hires people on the basis of 
sheer physical strength is not involved in direct discrimination against 
women, even if he hires few women.  Whether he indirectly discriminates 
against women in hiring on the basis of strength depends on why he 
hires on that basis.  He may, for instance, hire on that basis because the 
relevant jobs involve operating heavy machinery, and the reason 
machines are so designed is explained by failure to design the machines 
in such a way that men and women are equally capable of operating 
them.  If this in turn is explained by male dominance, then our employer 
may be (perhaps blamelessly) involved in indirect discrimination.7
 7. Suppose that, from the standpoint of the individual employer, it is a matter of 
“business necessity” that nearly only men are hired to operate the relevant machines, but 
that the manufacturer who produced the machines could easily and costlessly have 
designed them otherwise and would have done so in the absence of male dominance.  Cf. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), quoted in GERTRUDE EZORSKY, 
RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 39-40 (1991).  It would seem 
arbitrary to consider a situation morally bad if people are hired on the basis of 
requirements that, although nondiscriminatory in intent, are “discriminatory in operation” and 
do not reflect “business necessity,” but not consider the state of affairs just described 
morally bad from the point of view of discrimination. 




Cognitive discrimination is differential treatment that involves being 
less inclined to form beliefs somehow (un)favorable to Y than to form 
beliefs (un)favorable to Z given the same evidence for these beliefs.  A 
job applicant may be a cognitive discriminator if, given the same evidence 
of excellence, he is more inclined to believe that one company, managed 
by men, will be successful than he is to believe that another, managed by 
women, will be.  The same applicant is a noncognitive discriminator if 
he is less inclined to apply for a job with a company with a female 
executive manager because of a brute desire not to have a female boss.  
Often cognitive and noncognitive discrimination go hand in hand, but 
conceptually speaking they can easily be pried apart.  In principle, one 
can engage in cognitive discrimination in favor of a group while at the 
same time engaging in noncognitive discrimination against that group, 
and vice versa.8
Cognitive as well as noncognitive discrimination can be brute or 
valuation-based.  It is valuation-based if and only if it satisfies either of 
the following two conditions: (1) it reflects X’s view that Z’s interests 
count for more, morally speaking, than Y’s; or (2) it reflects X’s view 
that, while their interests count equally, Z and Y should not relate to each 
other or to X in the way they should relate to members of their own 
group.  An example of the former would be discrimination against blacks 
under apartheid.  An example of the latter would be discrimination based 
on traditional sex roles.9  If discrimination satisfies neither of these 
conditions, it is brute discrimination.  Discrimination in favor of physically 
attractive people may often take this form; it is not that we think their 
interests count for more, or that they ought to relate to others in different 
ways; it is simply that we have brute desires in favor of them. 
Brute as well as valuation-based discrimination divides into hierarchical 
and nonhierarchical forms.  In the former, the discriminator’s desires or 
values favor some groups over others.  In the latter, this is not the case.  
Rather, the discriminator prefers or values some groups over others in 
 8. Consider someone who always over-generalizes and thinks of people in terms 
of stereotypes.  Being brought up in a culture of guilt he is more inclined to do so when it 
comes to people of his own kind.  So while he makes ungrounded and unfavorable 
generalizations about people of, say, other religions, he makes even more ungrounded 
and unfavorable generalizations about people of his own religion.  This person is 
involved in cognitive discrimination in favor of people with a religion different from his 
own.  Offhand, this may seem odd.  Normally, we assume that a person who makes 
ungrounded and unfavorable generalizations about people of religious denominations 
different from his own is involved in negative cognitive discrimination.  This, however, 
is because we assume that people normally are not inclined to make ungrounded and 
unfavorable generalizations about people of their own kind. 
 9. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An 
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 590 (1977). 
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some contexts and for some purposes and that this preference or 
valuation is reversed in a number of equally important contexts. 
E.  “Suitably Explained” Differential Treatment 
The formula requires the relevant differential treatment to be suitably 
explained by membership of different socially salient groups because 
there are undeniably cases in which X treats Y differently from Z, this is 
(believed by X to be) disadvantageous to Y, Y and Z are members of 
different socially salient groups, and yet this differential treatment does 
not constitute discrimination.10  Consider a case in which, by an odd 
twist of nature, men can die from birth and onwards and will never 
become older than seventy years old, whereas no woman can die before 
she reaches the age of one thousand years nor become older than 1070 
years.  Suppose that in a situation of scarcity requiring a choice between 
a man and a woman, healthcare resources used to save lives are devoted 
to men, on the ground that any woman in need of life-saving healthcare 
will enjoy at least 930 more years than any man in need of such 
assistance.  Suppose, moreover, that if two men, or two women, are 
admitted to hospital for life-saving treatment and only one of them can 
be treated, the youngest one will receive treatment.  This practice 
involves treating women differently in a way that is disadvantageous to 
them.  Yet it is not a case of sex discrimination because the patients’ sex 
does not suitably explain the disadvantageous treatment of women.  The 
doctors attach no intrinsic significance to a patient’s sex. 
A complication must be brought into the picture: suppose the notion 
that “men enjoy power over women” explains why men (or people 
generally) came to believe, or presently believe, it to be just to devote 
life-saving healthcare resources to those who have enjoyed the least 
number of years.  Consider first the case in which male domination 
explains why people once came to hold a certain belief, but does not 
explain why people believe it now.  Had a different causal story brought 
them to where they are now, they would still now believe that life-saving 
medical treatment should be distributed on the basis of the number of 
years people have already enjoyed.  While neither the content of the 
 10. On a parallel point in relation to racism, compare Bernard R. Boxill, The 
Morality of Preferential Hiring, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 246, 257 (1978), with J.L.A. 
Garcia, The Heart of Racism, 27 J. SOC. PHIL. 5, 26 (1996), reprinted in RACE AND 
RACISM 284 (Bernard Boxill ed., 2001). 




belief allocating life-saving health care resources nor the fact that people 
presently hold this belief is tainted, the way in which people came to 
hold this belief is tainted.  Would this imply that the differential 
treatment of men is, after all, suitably explained by men and women 
being members of different socially salient groups?  We might plausibly 
assume that the present case is morally equivalent to a case which is 
identical with the first except that the same belief about the provision of 
health care has a genesis that is not tainted.  However, we would build a 
morally irrelevant distinction into our notion of discrimination if we 
were to answer this question affirmatively. 
Consider next the case in which male domination is part of the 
explanation of why people now believe that life-saving medical treatment 
should be distributed on the basis of the number of years a person has 
already enjoyed.  In this case, differential group membership explains 
the differential treatment.  The fact that some people are members of the 
same, dominant group explains why they are being favored over women 
by the dominant norms, and this fact in turn explains why they are being 
favored.  Even if we suppose that a fully informed, impartial being 
would recommend that life-saving medical treatment be distributed on 
the basis of the number of years already lived, we would still say that 
women are subjected to discrimination in the case described; after all, 
their disadvantageous differential treatment in this particular context, 
though by accident entirely just, is explained by their not being members 
of the dominant group. 
F.  Socially Salient Groups 
The formula refers to discrimination for and against different socially 
salient groups.  A group is socially salient if perceived membership in it 
is important to the structure of social interactions across a wide range of 
social contexts.11  “Skill at making widgets” is irrelevant to almost any 
kind of social interaction.  Hence, a manufacturer who produces widgets 
and prefers not to appoint applicants lacking skills in widget-making 
does not, in the present sense, discriminate against such people.  Having 
green eyes is also irrelevant in almost any social context.  In contrast, an 
 11. For a slightly different, subjective account of social salience, see H.E. Baber, 
Gender Conscious, 18 J. APPLIED PHIL. 53 (2001) (“A property is socially salient . . . to 
the extent that . . . [people] take it to predict or explain beliefs, character traits, tastes or 
other socially significant psychological characteristics.”).  While the property of being a 
member of a certain group may in fact structure social interactions even if people do not 
ascribe explanatory relevance to it, and vice versa, one might suppose that there is a 
tendency for people to ascribe explanatory significance to being a member of a certain 
group if in fact perceived membership of it structures a wide range of social contexts, 
and vice versa. 
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individual’s apparent sex, race, or religion will affect social interactions 
in many social contexts.12
Having green eyes is special in the sense that, apart from being 
insignificant in almost any social context, it is very easily perceived in 
face-to-face encounters.  Membership in many other groups will not be 
immediately visible in this way.  Perceptions of such membership may, 
however, be very important to the structure of social interactions.  Being 
gay in a homophobic society presumably tends not to structure social 
interactions in very many contexts because gays often have a strong 
incentive to conceal their sexuality; yet being perceived to be gay in the 
same society will have an important influence on social interactions.  For 
our purposes, a group is socially salient even if membership of it is not 
easily established as long as perceived membership of it has an 
important influence on social interactions in a wide range of context. 
If membership in a certain group structures social interactions in a 
wide range of contexts, it is very likely that such membership is also 
quite central to the members’ sense of who they are.  Given the former, 
membership in the relevant group is likely to be seen either, by 
members, as quite central to their own sense of who they are or, by 
others, as quite central to who the members are.  In the latter case, this 
will tend to affect members’ own sense of who they are by increasing 
the centrality of group membership to the members themselves.13  While 
importance to the structuring of social interactions and centrality to 
people’s self-conception will therefore tend to go hand in hand, analytically 
these are separate issues.  Hence, there could be cases of people who are 
treated disadvantageously on grounds of membership in a nonsalient 
group, membership of which is crucial to their sense of who they are; or 
there could be cases of people who are treated disadvantageously on the 
basis of membership in a salient group, membership of which, however, 
is insignificant to their sense of who they are. 
An example of nonsalient but crucial membership would be 
nationalists singled out for unfavorable treatment by colonial masters, 
where being Indonesian is very important to the nationalists’ self-
 12. See Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 586, 590 (drawing a similar contrast). 
 13. Anti-Semitism, for instance, tends to make being Jewish play a more 
prominent role in the self-conception of those people who are subjected to it.  G.A. 
COHEN, IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU’RE SO RICH? 34 (2000) 
(commenting that Jean-Paul Sartre’s extravagant claim that “it is the anti-Semite who 
creates the Jew,” although an exaggeration, contains some truth). 




conception, but, initially, something not recognized by other Indonesians 
as important.14  An example of salient but insignificant membership 
would be people in South Africa under apartheid who were brought up 
to think of themselves as whites but who, due to surprising facts about 
their ancestry, later in life suddenly came to be thought of by others, 
including the authorities, as colored people.  Given the above definition 
of socially salient groups, only the latter kind of case might involve 
discrimination. 
This concept of social salience introduces two scalar dimensions: 
perceived membership in a group may be anything from slightly 
important to wholly dominant in the structure of social interactions, and 
it may be important in more or fewer social contexts.  In principle, group 
X may be just as salient, all things considered, as group Y, even though 
perceived membership in X structures social interactions in fewer social 
contexts than membership in Y, as long as X carries greater importance 
in the contexts it actually structures.15
At least two reasons tie discrimination to socially salient groups.  
Almost all groups on whose behalf the charge of being discriminated 
against is voiced are socially salient groups.  Women, elderly people, 
disabled people, gays and lesbians, and ethnic and racial minorities are 
all socially salient groups in this sense.  In fact, it appears that only one 
kind of discrimination does not involve a socially salient group: the use 
of genetic information by insurance companies to “discriminate” against 
people with certain kinds of bad luck in the genetic lottery.  This practice 
does not qualify as discrimination because these people do not constitute 
a socially salient group—at least not presently.  Nothing is lost, and 
perhaps some clarity is gained, if we discuss cases of “genetic discrimination” 
as cases of unjust, albeit (in the less than all-inclusive sense mentioned 
above) nondiscriminatory, uses of genetic information. 
There are cases involving disadvantageous differential treatment that 
we would probably consider discriminatory if the relevant groups were 
socially salient, but in which the term discrimination is not entirely apt 
precisely because the relevant group is not socially salient.  An employer 
might be more inclined to hire applicants with green, rather than brown 
or blue, eyes.  This idiosyncrasy might not amount to discrimination in 
the sense that interests us here, even though the employer obviously 
differentiates between different applicants in a way that is disadvantageous 
 14. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 110-12 (1983). 
 15. To elaborate the notion of social salience further one would have to say 
something about the individuation of social contexts and about the sorts of structuring of 
these that are relevant for present purposes.  Although it is somewhat unclear when a 
group is socially salient, this is not a flaw with the formula.  It simply reflects the fact 
that the contours of our concept of discrimination are somewhat fuzzy. 
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to some of them.16  This is not to deny that such idiosyncrasies can be as 
bad as, and reflect as corrupted a character as, genuinely discriminatory 
acts.  However, they will not seriously harm the disadvantaged party in 
the great majority of cases, precisely because of their idiosyncratic 
nature.  People with green eyes may find other employers who are 
indifferent or, in rare cases, idiosyncratically attracted to their eye colors 
and will, if informed of the reason they did not get the job, infer that the 
employer was an oddball; diminished self-respect will not be an 
automatic effect of the information they receive.17
Generally speaking, we are more likely to view differential treatment 
as discrimination to the extent that the following three conditions are 
met: (1) membership is evidenced by a dichotomous distribution of 
individuals in the relevant and contrasting groups; (2) all individuals are 
a member of only one group; and (3) it is evident whether or not 
someone is member of a certain group.  “People of a similar outlook,” 
for instance, satisfies neither of these conditions.  For very many sets of 
three persons, it is very hard to tell if X or Y is the person with an 
outlook that is most similar to Z’s.  Moreover, for any individual there is 
a group consisting of individuals with a similar outlook and very few, if 
any, are not members of more than one such group.  Things are different 
with the groups that we most readily think of as being subjected to 
discrimination.  You can be a man or a women; (almost) everyone is 
either a man or a woman but not both.  “Physical attraction” is somewhere 
between people with similar outlook and sex.  Although in principle 
there is a wide spectrum of degrees of physical attractiveness, most 
people use a coarse-grained system of classification as evidenced by the 
fact that our ordinary language contains rather few predicates relating to 
people’s looks such that these predicates together form an ordinal 
ranking from best to worst.  Moreover, while people vary somewhat with 
regard to how they classify different people, their judgments tend not to 
differ very much when they differ and tend to agree at the extremes. 
The restriction of the scope of discrimination to differential treatment 
of socially salient groups also explains why we do not talk about 
discrimination against non-family members or against unqualified 
applicants.  While it is true of each of us that we are not members of 
 16. David Wasserman, Discrimination, Concept of, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED 
ETHICS 805, 807 (1998). 
 17. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 198 (“[T]he social costs of particular kinds of 
discrimination are a function of how widespread those kinds of discrimination are.”). 




most families, there is no group of people made up of non-family 
members as such.  Similarly, everyone is unqualified for some jobs, 
although, arguably, the category of people who are unqualified for any 
job has no members.18
Still, it is not clear that the above account of discrimination in terms of 
differential treatment of members of socially salient groups is entirely 
satisfactory.  Let Y designate the group of people whom, morally speaking, 
X ought to treat worse than Z.  Assume Y is the group of morally 
undeserving people, whereas Z is the group of morally deserving people.  
Suppose X treats Y worse than Z and does so believing that he himself 
treats Y disadvantageously compared to Z, and suppose that differential 
group membership suitably explains why X treats Y worse than Z.  
Suppose, finally, that the morally deserving and the morally undeserving 
are socially salient groups.  This would qualify as discrimination.  But X 
ought morally to treat Y worse than Z; X simply does what he ought to 
do by “discriminating against” Y.  It follows that, if we do not want to 
allow ourselves to say that we ought to discriminate against some groups, 
we will need to revise my account. 
In practice, this objection might be ignored, of course.  People differ 
greatly over the question of who is morally undeserving, and even where 
they do not differ, they rarely have sufficient information to tell whether 
or not someone with whom they interact is morally deserving.  Hence, 
discrimination against the undeserving is unlikely for conceptual as well 
empirical reasons.  However, if we want our definition of discrimination 
not just to apply to actual but also possible cases of discrimination, we 
need to address this challenge.  So suppose that, due to an emerging 
moral consensus and technological improvements, moral desert is as 
transparent as sex.  In that situation, it would be in no way odd to say 
that someone discriminates against the undeserving if he treats them 
worse than they deserve to be treated, thinks of them in terms of 
stereotypes, is insensitive to differences between different gradations of 
undeserving persons, and so on.  Of course, if someone treated everyone 
exactly as he ought to treat them, he would, let us suppose, treat people 
differently.  But barring a cosmic coincidence, his differential treatment 
would not be suitably explained by the differential group membership of 
different individuals, but rather by their individual desert levels, in 
 18. In a society divided into a few enlarged families, or clans, where people are 
treated differently depending on family membership, we might well approach a situation 
in which differentiating between people on the basis of family membership involves 
discrimination to the extent that clan membership is a socially salient group identity.  (Of 
course, it is likely that clan membership would be socially salient in that way.)  A similar 
point may apply to a group of people who are literally unqualified for virtually any job 
where membership of the group is easily detected. 
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which case it would not qualify as discrimination.  If it were, then the fit 
between the actual treatment and the deserved treatment could not be 
perfect.19
III.  SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
How should one approach the question of the moral wrongness of 
private discrimination?  Part II defined private discrimination with three 
separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.  The first two look 
morally irrelevant; treating one person better than another and believing 
that one is doing so are not wrong-making features.  Hence, what is 
morally distinctive about discrimination is the fact that one’s differential 
treatment of people is suitably explained by their membership of different 
socially salient groups.  Does this in itself have any moral significance?  
This may depend on the relevant contrast. 
First, the relevant contrasting cases might be those in which the fact 
that some are treated better than others is suitably explained by their 
membership of groups that are not socially salient.  To test whether this 
contrast makes a moral difference, we could compare a case of genuine 
discrimination, as defined, with a suitably similar case in which the 
differential treatment is explained by membership of different groups 
that are not socially salient.  For example, we could compare a case of 
racial discrimination against African-Americans (or, to take an example 
that is closer to home for this Author, Danish citizens of Arab descent) 
with an otherwise comparable case of idiosyncratic racial discrimination 
against people from Inverness and people who, however distantly in 
time, have an ancestor from Inverness.  Looking at matters this way, it is 
very hard to see how social salience could be morally relevant.  While 
discrimination tends to involve all sorts of harms, hatred, and crazy 
supremacist ideas that differential treatment of people on grounds of 
membership of different socially nonsalient groups does not involve, this 
is a contingent difference; it does not show that discrimination is worse 
 19. Suppose Y is very deserving and Z is very undeserving, and yet X treats them 
in a way that is equally beneficial to them because Z, unlike Y, is a member of a socially 
salient group with which X identifies.  Surely, this constitutes discrimination against Y 
and yet my definition seems to suggest that it is not because X acts in a way that is 
equally beneficial to them and, thus, does not treat Y differently from Z.  However, X 
does treat Y and Z differently since he is less inclined to reward Z’s deserts than Y’s and 
this is suitably explained by their differential membership of socially salient groups.  
More generally, I suspect that any putative counterexample of equal treatment constituting 
discrimination will also involve unequal treatment. 




than corresponding cases of differential treatment involving socially 
nonsalient groups. 
Could the relevant contrast be between cases in which the differential 
treatment is suitably explained by different individual properties, 
excluding the property of being a member of a certain group?20  If this 
contrast makes a moral difference, discrimination may be morally wrong 
because, like nondiscriminatory differential treatment, it involves differential 
treatment of people that is suitably explained by their membership of 
different groups.  However, it is not in itself morally wrong to treat people 
on the basis of their differential membership of different socially salient 
groups.  To take just one example from the literature, it is not morally 
wrong to temporarily segregate prisoners during a race riot.21
It might be argued, however, that while it is not necessarily morally 
wrong it is always morally preferable to treat individuals on the basis of 
their individual properties rather than on the basis of their membership 
in socially salient groups.  In the example just mentioned, it would be 
preferable, other things being equal, to segregate prisoners on the basis 
of their individual properties even if it this segregation will be largely 
equivalent to racial segregation.  However, even the weaker claim that, 
while it is not necessarily morally wrong, it is always morally preferable 
to treat individuals on the basis of their individual properties rather than 
on the basis of their membership in socially salient groups is dubious. 
First, differential treatment on the basis of group membership will in 
some cases lead to stigmatic harm, suspicions about hostility, and so on.  
But so may treatment on an individual basis.  For instance, members of a 
group that would on average be treated better given differential 
treatment based on group membership than they would given differential 
treatment based on individual properties may see the latter as yet another 
way of stigmatizing and expressing hostility toward group members.  
Moreover, in cases in which groups struggle for recognition, the struggle 
may well involve the demand that in some contexts people are treated as 
members of groups rather than on the basis of individual properties.  
 20. There is a difference between being treated on the basis of properties of groups 
of which one is a member and being treated on the basis of one’s membership of a 
certain group.  If, for instance, I ascribe to a certain individual the property of being 
more likely than other individuals to engage in violent political acts because the religious 
group to which he belongs is more likely to engage in violent political acts, I treat him 
solely on the basis of properties of the group to which he belongs.  If I ascribe the 
property to him of being more (or less) likely to engage in violent political acts on the 
basis of my knowledge about him, including my knowledge about his religious 
affiliation, then I do not treat him solely on the basis of properties of the group to which 
he belongs.  In the second situation I remain open to information suggesting a gap 
between his properties and the properties of a group to which he belongs. 
 21. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreward: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976). 
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Members of a religious minority may prefer, for instance, food to be 
served to its members that is cooked in accordance with religious rules 
rather than in accordance with each member’s food preference.  Even 
members who otherwise do not care much for traditional food may 
prefer to be treated on the basis of group membership, because this is a 
way of securing the positive opposite of stigmatic harm.  Attributes of 
the beneficiaries are rendered “deeply crediting,” and the bearer of the 
relevant religious identity is restored to “wholeness” and “usualness.”22
Second, differential group membership will often involve treating 
individuals in a way that they ought not to be treated given their 
individual properties.  For example, prisoners of different races in Brest’s 
example23 may be separated even if people who knew their individual 
characters, relations to one another, and so on, would not segregate 
them.  But the same may happen in the case of differential treatment on 
the basis of individual properties.  Any such treatment must rely on the 
discriminator’s beliefs about individual properties; but these may be 
false and the differential treatment flowing from them, thus, misplaced.  
If the discriminator estimates individual properties poorly, the resulting 
differential treatment may be even more misplaced than differential 
treatment based on group membership.  In that case, it would seem 
reasonable for individuals to demand that they be treated on that latter 
basis, not on the basis of what their individual properties are believed to 
be.  Individuals might have a claim to be treated in the way that they 
deserve to be treated in virtue of their individual properties.  Whether 
this claim is best satisfied by treating individuals on the basis of their 
believed membership of groups or on the basis of their believed 
individual properties is an empirical matter.  In conclusion, the modest 
claim that it is morally preferable to treat individuals on the basis of their 
individual properties is false. 
The next preliminary observation further supports the claim that, 
offhand, it seems very hard to argue that discrimination is morally wrong 
per se.  First of all, as we saw, discrimination need not harm the 
discriminatee relative to how well off he or she was prior to the 
discriminatory act or to how well off he or she would have been in the 
absence of the discriminatory act.  For obvious reasons, discussions 
about the morality of discrimination tend to focus on cases in which 
 22. Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 2-3 (1963). 
 23. See Brest, supra note 21. 




discriminatees suffer relative harm in these senses, but, as we have seen, 
discriminatory acts may leave the discriminatees better off than they 
otherwise would have been.  If morally supererogatory acts are possible, 
X’s discriminatory act against Y may even leave Y better off than Y 
would have been had X acted in a way that morally permissible for him 
to act but refrained from—say, because he donated all of his possessions 
in a supererogatory, discriminatory way. 
Accordingly, libertarians can hardly claim that the discriminating 
philanthropist violates anyone’s rights by giving away what he himself 
owns and has a right not to give away in the first place.24  Virtue ethicists, 
who see no vice in failure to be equally concerned for everyone’s 
welfare, can hardly say that the discriminating philanthropist necessarily 
displays a vicious character.  Kantians cannot say the philanthropist 
treats those whom he benefits less than others as mere means rather than 
as ends in themselves; after all, he has an intrinsic concern for their 
welfare, only it is not as great as his intrinsic concern for the welfare of 
members of other socially salient groups. 
Nor need it be true that the discriminating philanthropist violates a 
right to be treated with equal respect and concern, supposing for a 
moment that we have a right to be so treated by the state and by private 
individuals.  The philanthropist might do what he does because he 
correctly takes his preference to be, so to speak, counterbalanced by the 
different preferences of other discriminating philanthropists.  In this case 
one might indeed argue that at a basic level, the former treats everyone 
with equal respect and concern even if, given his factual assumptions, he 
allows himself to treat some with greater concern than others.25  
Teleological egalitarians cannot claim that discrimination is necessarily 
bad, since discrimination against the otherwise better off may reduce 
inequality.26
 24. They might deny, however, that it follows from the fact that you have a right 
not to do p that you have a right to do p without doing q.  Many people believe that there 
is a limit to how much you are morally required to do for your children.  However, they 
also believe that if you do more than you are morally required to do, you are still morally 
required to treat your children equally.  Some left-libertarians believe that you do not 
have full ownership over your external resources.  See Peter Vallentyne, Libertarianism, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., July 24, 2006, at 1, 4-5, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
libertarianism/.  Accordingly, they might want to argue that although you have the right 
to keep “your” external resources for yourself, you do not have the right to dispose of 
them in a discriminatory manner if you decide to give them away. 
 25. Many parents might respond precisely this way if they were accused of not 
treating everyone with equal concern and respect by favoring their own children over 
others’ children. 
 26. For an example of a teleological egalitarian, see generally LARRY S. TEMKIN, 
INEQUALITY (1993) (describing teleological egalitarianism as holding that undeserved 
inequality is always objectionable). 
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The second reason it is hard to argue that discrimination is morally 
wrong per se is that, as we saw, there are many different ways of 
discriminating against individuals.  Offhand, some of them seem to be 
morally much less problematic than others, if morally problematic at all.  
For instance, differential treatment on the basis of preferences for goods 
and services that came to be available in a tainted way but are now held 
for non-tainted reasons may amount to discrimination, but it can hardly 
be claimed to be intrinsically morally wrong.27
The conclusion to draw from these observations is that discrimination 
is in itself neither morally wrong nor morally undesirable in the way that 
some ethicists take, say, killing an innocent person to be.  This leaves us 
with two positions, either or both of which may be correct.  One possibility 
is that some, though not all, forms of discrimination are necessarily 
morally wrong; the other is that while some forms of discrimination are 
not wrong, many kinds are, and perhaps often for similar reasons.  The 
following Parts explore the first possibility,28 and critique respect-based 
accounts of why the second possibility is an actuality.29
IV.  DESERT-PRIORITARIANISM 
Desert-accommodating prioritarianism might best explain the moral 
wrongness of private discrimination.  Richard Arneson expounded this 
view, in another context, in the following terms: 
Institutions and practices should be set and actions chosen to maximize moral value, 
with the moral value of achieving a gain (avoiding a loss) for a person being (i) 
greater, the greater the amount of well-being for the person the gain (averted 
loss) involves; (ii) greater, the lower the person’s lifetime expectation of well-
being prior to receipt of the benefit (avoidance of the loss); (iii) greater, the 
larger the degree to which the person deserves this gain (loss avoidance).  We 
ought to maximize well-being weighted by priority and responsibility.30
 27. Alexander, supra note 4, at 187-89.  Such differential treatment might, of 
course, be experienced as humiliating and offensive, but this does not establish that it is 
intrinsically morally wrong, as can be seen if we imagine that everyone is unaware of the 
tainted history of the preferences. 
 28. See infra Part IV.  This exploration ignores the highly defensible view that 
discrimination that fails to maximize moral value on the prioritarian, desert-accommodating 
view is necessarily wrong. 
 29. See infra Part V. 
 30. Richard J. Arneson, Egalitarianism and Responsibility, 3 J. ETHICS 225, 239-
40 (1999).  Strictly speaking, desert-accommodating prioritarianism is not a particular 
moral principle, but a family of moral principles whose members differ from each other 
in terms of how much weight they give to the three factors held to be intrinsically 




On this view a given amount of well-being has greater moral value 
when it accrues to a badly off, deserving person than it does when it 
accrues to a well off, undeserving person.  Extra benefits to people 
always increase moral value.  Hence, an act that leaves some worse off 
and no one better off cannot be morally right (unless it affects people’s 
levels of desert). 
Desert-accommodating prioritarianism differs from utilitarianism.  
First, it leaves open whether well-being should be construed along 
perfectionist lines.  Second, it ascribes intrinsic, not just instrumental, 
moral significance to considerations about desert.31  Finally, it is not 
indifferent to the distribution of well-being among an act’s beneficiaries.  
All other things being equal, desert-accommodating prioritarianism 
favors a more equal distribution over a less equal distribution.  Equality 
in itself, however, has no moral significance on this view, not even when 
the desert levels of different individuals are equal.  Hence, desert-
accommodating prioritarianism may favor more unequal distribution 
where some redistribution involves a loss of resources, if some people 
better convert resources into well-being, or if equality unavoidably 
erodes incentives and thus reduces the pool of resources. 
Desert-accommodating prioritarianism explains some of the moral 
distinctions that we want to make between different ways of discriminating.  
Consider first the issue of “reverse discrimination” or affirmative action.  
Assuming that such discrimination tends to favor people who are 
worse off and no less deserving than others, desert-accommodating 
prioritarianism can explain why it is morally different from the kinds of 
“non-reverse discrimination” which we know of and which, almost 
without exceptions, tend to harm those who are worse off.32  Second, we 
tend to consider discrimination worse the more harm it imposes on 
discriminatees and the worse off they are.  The present account explains 
why discrimination against vulnerable and stigmatized groups tends to 
be morally worse than idiosyncratic discrimination against privileged 
and non-stigmatized groups (and against otherwise privileged but 
stigmatized groups).  Third, suppose, contrary to an earlier suggestion, 
morally significant.  This Article does not attempt to specify these weights.  Such 
specifications can only be done in a rough and intuitive way.  See Derek Parfit, Equality 
and Priority, in IDEALS OF EQUALITY 1, 12 (Andrew Mason ed., 1998) (noting, however, 
that such specifications will be clear in many cases). 
 31. This raises the worry of a problematic circularity: What X deserves at t1 
depends on whether X performs the right act at t1; that act in turn depends partly on what 
X deserves at t1.  One view that avoids this problem says, as many do, that what one 
deserves depends wholly on what one did in the past.  I thank Larry Alexander for 
pressing me on this point. 
 32. This is not to deny that other accounts apart from the desert-accommodating 
prioritarian account may explain this as well. 
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that the group of unqualified applicants is a socially salient group.  In 
that case, the desert-accommodating prioritarian account does not imply 
that discrimination against unqualified applicants (based on their lack of 
qualifications) is necessarily morally wrong.  For it is reasonable to 
assume that, for reasons of efficiency, maximization of moral value 
requires there to be a general fit between a person’s qualifications and 
the job that he or she obtains. 
The desert-prioritarian view, like other accounts of the wrongness of 
discrimination that appeal to considerations of harm, provides a 
satisfying, two-pronged explanation of why we have a concept marking 
differential treatment based on membership of socially salient groups.  
First, stigma is a major type of harm involved in discrimination, perhaps 
the most grievous harm distinctive to discrimination.  Stigmatic harm 
renders attributes of the victim “deeply discrediting” thereby reducing 
the bearer “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted 
one.”33  It is unlike pain in that one individual’s pain will not harm 
another individual, unless this individual cares about the first individual, 
for example, because they are related as child to parent.34  In contrast, 
stigmatic harms spread across persons belonging to socially salient 
groups even when they do not harbor external preferences for the well-
being of other members of the group.  If an African-American person is 
treated as a “tainted, discounted one” by virtue of being African-American, 
then the stigmatization will likely harm other African-American persons; 
they will also be seen by some as “tainted, discounted” individuals.35  Where 
a person with green eyes (or another socially nonsalient property) is treated 
in a likewise manner on account of his green eyes, other people with 
green eyes are unlikely to suffer. 
The second reason we have a concept marking differential treatment 
of people based on membership of socially salient groups is that when 
individuals suffer disadvantageous treatment of this kind, the “individual 
acts of discrimination” are likely to “combine into a systematic and 
inequitable frustration of opportunity.”36  When individuals suffer 
 33. GOFFMAN, supra note 22, at 3. 
 34. Hence, to care about whether others of one’s own kind are subjected to 
stigmatic harm, one need not have a preference that is intrinsically external, that is to 
say, intrinsically about how someone else fares. 
 35. GOFFMAN, supra note 22, at 3. 
 36. Brest, supra note 21, at 10.  Stigmatic harm tends to be a species of cumulative 
harms; the stigmatic harm is not a result of a singular act or a small number of singular 
acts, but the cumulated result of a large set of acts. 




disadvantageous treatment based on membership of socially nonsalient 
groups (or on the basis of most individual properties), no such 
cumulative harm is likely to ensue.  The harm involved in each act of 
discrimination may be very close to zero.37  However, the marginal harm 
from discriminatory acts is likely to rise steeply when a certain threshold 
number of discriminatory acts against a particular individual has been 
reached.38  Individual acts of discrimination may, were they to take place 
in an otherwise discrimination-free social context, harm no one or involve 
only imperceptible harms.39  Hence, when applying the prioritarian principle, 
we should not apply it merely to individual acts of discrimination; we 
need to apply it to sets or series of acts.  A single act that does not fail to 
maximize moral value may nevertheless be a member of a set of acts 
that is wrong, because there are other sets of acts that bring about more 
moral value.40
Summing up these two observations, the harm involved in disadvantageous 
differential treatment based on membership of socially salient groups 
is likely to spread across individual acts and to accumulate across 
individual acts.  The same is not true of disadvantageous differential 
treatment based on membership of socially nonsalient groups or 
individual properties. 
This section has described some implications of desert-accommodating 
prioritarianism vis-à-vis the morality of private discrimination.  These 
implications are welcome, and support desert-prioritarianism.  However, 
some of the implications combine equally well with moral positions 
 37. Indeed, each such act may, considered on its own rather than as a member of a 
large set of discriminatory acts, be beneficial as a result, say, of the draconian social 
sanctions imposed on people belonging to different, hierarchically ordered groups who 
relate to one another in a nondiscriminatory way. 
 38. What will at first constitute a violation of formal equality of opportunity will 
turn into a serious violation of substantive equality of opportunity.  Unless one is 
extremely unlucky and differential treatment on whimsical grounds common, differential 
treatment on whimsical grounds is unlikely to turn into a serious violation of substantive 
equality of opportunity.  See Richard Arneson, Equality of Opportunity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., Oct. 8, 2002, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-opportunity/; see also Paul 
Woodruff, What’s Wrong with Discrimination?, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 
39, 40-41 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1995) (discussing disrespect-related harms). 
 39. An applicant who is denied a job as result of discrimination in an otherwise 
discrimination-free social context is, of course, harmed in that he does not get the job.  
However, the applicant who in fact got the job would otherwise have been harmed in this 
way.  The distinctive kind of harm involved in discrimination tends to arise only in social 
contexts that are permeated with discrimination. 
 40. Compare Frank Jackson, Group Morality, in METAPHYSICS AND MORALITY 91, 
98-103 (Philip Pettit et al. eds., 1987) (ignoring the effects of sets of acts), with DEREK 
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70-73 (1984) (arguing that individual acts which are not 
morally wrong can be made wrong by membership in a wrongful set of acts). 
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other than desert-prioritarianism,41 so that a discussion of the morality of 
discrimination does not alone provide sufficient grounds to accept desert-
prioritarianism.  Pressing on, the following sections test the implications of 
desert-prioritarianism, taken to be independently plausible, in the area of 
private discrimination.  We turn first to some implications of desert-
prioritarianism which seem somewhat problematic. 
A.  Distinctiveness of the Wrong of Discrimination 
One challenge to the desert-prioritarian is that if discrimination is 
wrong simply because it fails to maximize the sum of moral value, then 
there is nothing distinctively wrong with discrimination.  It is wrong in 
exactly the same way that all other sorts of harmful or desert-level 
reducing acts are wrong.  This cannot be right, because we know 
discrimination to be wrong in distinctive ways.  For instance, Matt 
Cavanagh objects that an account of the wrongness of discrimination 
that appeals to the ideal of equality “does not seem to capture what is 
distinctively wrong with discrimination.”42
This challenge can be answered.43  There are two ways in which 
discrimination might involve a distinctive wrong.  First, it might violate 
a basic moral principle that pertains to discrimination in the same way 
that some deontologists think that basic moral principles pertain to lying 
or to the killing of innocents.44  Second, it might often cause or involve 
kinds of harm or reductions of levels of desert that are associated only 
with discrimination, for example, a sense of shame of one’s social identity 
or a sense of being inferior or, at least, as being regarded as inferior.45  It 
seems question-begging to object that desert-prioritarianism does not 
show that there is anything distinctively wrong with discrimination in 
the first sense.  To object that it implies that there is nothing distinctively 
 41. Whether some of the implications support a respect-based account as well is 
discussed later.  See infra Part V. 
 42. CAVANAGH, supra note 1, at 155. 
 43. Despite Cavanagh’s challenge, it turns out that even he does not think that 
there is anything distinctively wrong with discrimination.  He thinks discrimination is 
wrong when it involves treating someone with unwarranted contempt.  Id. at 166.  But if 
that it is the case, then presumably wrongful discriminatory acts are wrong for the very 
same reason as other acts that are nondiscriminatory but involve treating someone with 
unwarranted contempt. 
 44. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 30-53 (1978). 
 45. See Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 593; see also LAWRENCE BLUM, “I’M NOT A 
RACIST, BUT . . .” 8-11 (2002) (discussing inferiorization caused by racism). 




wrong about discrimination in the second sense is plainly wrong.  As we 
have seen above, defenders of the desert-prioritarianism and other harm-
based accounts can say that the harm involved in discrimination is 
distinctive, either in terms of the kinds of harmful effects that discrimination 
involves or in terms of the kinds of harm that being discriminated 
against may be thought to constitute. 
B.  The Special Significance of Harms to Discriminatees 
A different challenge says that insofar as discrimination is wrong 
because someone is harmed, it must be primarily wrong because it harms 
those who are subjected to discrimination.  So any account tying the 
wrongness of discrimination to harm must make sure that it is somehow 
tied especially to the harm suffered by those who are subjected to the 
discrimination.46  It might be denied that the desert-prioritarian account 
does that. 
Suppose X discriminates against Y, and third-party Z is neither 
subjected to discrimination nor discriminates.  There are then two cases 
to consider: whether it is worse that Y is harmed rather than Z, and 
whether it is worse that Y (or Z) is harmed rather than X.  Assuming that 
one does not necessarily become morally more deserving by being 
subjected to discrimination, it follows that, all other things being equal, 
it could be morally irrelevant whether the harm involved in Y’s being 
discriminated against falls on Y rather than Z. 
This implication is not damaging.  Suppose an ethnic majority 
discriminates against an ethnic minority.  Suppose we initially regard this 
as morally wrong, but we then discover that, contrary to what we had 
supposed, the discrimination does not harm the ethnic minority.  The 
harm we thought fell on this minority actually falls on another ethnic 
minority, one that is not discriminated against.  I doubt that we would 
then conclude with some relief that the discrimination in question is less 
bad than we had thought initially.  A second point is this: assuming that 
the actions one performs determine desert, being discriminated against 
(or being subjected to unjust treatment in general) cannot in itself affect 
one’s desert status.  This, of course, is consistent with the expectation 
that if two people enjoy the same level of benefits and one of them has 
been subjected to discrimination, this latter person is likely to have a 
higher level of desert than the other because he had to strive harder to 
obtain his benefits. 
 46. E.g., CAVANAGH, supra note 1, at 157 (asserting this objection against 
meritocratic accounts of the wrongness of discrimination). 
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This clarification implies that it is morally irrelevant whether X or Y 
(or Z) is harmed.  One might urge that this implication is damaging.  
However, in cases in which we think it matters morally whether harms 
or benefits fall to the discriminator, X, or to others (including the victim 
of discrimination, Y, or a third party, Z), the discriminator is presumably 
morally less deserving by virtue of being a discriminator.  Given this, it 
follows from the proposed account that it is worse for a given harm to 
fall on Y or Z rather than X.47  To many this will seem to favor desert-
accommodating prioritarianism over straight prioritarianism and other 
views according to which desert has no intrinsic moral relevance.48
C.  Beneficial Discrimination 
Consider a case in which someone is subjected to discrimination and, 
perversely, this maximizes moral value on the specifications described 
above; perhaps the discriminatee benefits because adversity strengthens 
his will to succeed and dramatically increases his level of desert;49 
perhaps the benefit to others more than compensates for, morally 
speaking, the harm to the discriminatee.  On the present account, such 
discrimination is not morally wrong.  This implication is bound to be 
seen as problematic, just as some would say that, against the desert-
prioritarian principle, the mere fact that a given act of lying, deceiving, 
or killing an innocent maximizes moral value does not render it morally 
permissible. 
Friends of desert-prioritarianism can concede that something may well 
be morally amiss in cases involving beneficial discriminatory acts, but 
insist that what is morally amiss is not that the act is wrong.  To deny 
that a certain discriminatory act that maximizes moral value is bad is not 
to imply that the agent cannot be criticized for performing it; the agent 
 47. In cases where discrimination is not wrong, being a discriminator presumably 
does not render one less deserving.  Accordingly, it is not clear that one may 
convincingly object to the proposed view on the grounds that it does not discount harms 
to the discriminator in such cases. 
 48. Some may object that the proposed view does not go far enough.  For example, 
they may retributively think it morally better that the discriminators’ well-being is 
lowered; it is not merely that the moral value of a given level of well-being for them is 
reduced.  Alternatively, they may reject that in cases in which all other things are not 
equal—for example, the discriminators are much worse off than those whom they 
subject to racial discrimination—it may be better that the resulting loss of well-being 
falls on those who are subjected to discrimination, rather than on those badly-off people 
who discriminate. 
 49. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 188. 




might, for example, have had reason to believe that the act would on 
balance harm the discriminatee, and thus attract blame for performing 
the act.  Nor need it oblige us to deny that it is bad that the agent’s 
character predisposes him to perform the discriminatory act; on most 
occasions, discriminatory acts far from maximize moral value, so we 
should cultivate a character that does not lead us to perform them.50  
Hence, if a discriminatory act maximizes moral value, in all likelihood 
we can still criticize the discriminator for his conduct, his moral 
reasoning, or his character, even if we cannot say that the discriminatory 
act is bad as such.51  Admittedly, there could be cases in which we could 
do neither of these things, but then in such cases—such as a case in 
which the discriminator intends his act to strengthen the discriminatee’s 
resolve and thereby benefit him—we are unlikely to have any firm moral 
intuitions to the effect that there really is something morally amiss with 
the discriminatory act. 
D.  The Moral Permissibility of Harmful Discrimination                           
that Maximizes Moral Value 
Suppose the only way to maximize moral value is through formal 
discrimination—for example, legal discrimination forbidding some 
socially salient groups to do what other socially salient groups are 
permitted to do—and substantive discrimination—that is, differential 
treatment that makes members of some socially salient groups worse off 
than they would be in the absence of such treatment.  On the view 
proposed here, discrimination would be morally required under such 
circumstances.  This is bound to strike some as implausible.  Is it 
seriously so? 
One reason for answering in the affirmative involves a misunderstanding 
and is therefore best set aside at once.  It may be suspected that anyone 
who considers a certain kind of action (such as lying, killing, or 
discriminating) morally permissible in circumstances very different from 
those under which we live is somehow committed to the view that this 
kind of action is not so morally wrong, after all, in our actual circumstances.  
Although the claim that a certain type of action would be morally wrong 
under any possible circumstance is often taken to imply that the action is 
 50. See R. M. HARE, ESSAYS IN ETHICAL THEORY 212-30 (1989) (distinguishing 
between judgments of rightness of the act, judgments of moral rationality of the act, and 
judgments of character of the agent). 
 51. For a related point about intentions and moral impermissibility, see Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments, 109 ETHICS 497, 
515-18 (1999), and T. M. Scanlon & Jonathan Dancy, Intention and Permissibility, in 
Supp. 74 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 301, 301-17 (2000). 
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seriously morally wrong, this does not strictly follow.52  One could, in 
principle, consider a certain kind of act to be mildly morally wrong 
whatever the circumstances.  In that case, someone who thought the 
relevant kind of act was wrong only under some circumstances might 
consider the act to be morally more wrong under the circumstances in 
which they are wrong than the person who finds them mildly morally 
wrong whatever the circumstances.  Therefore, the present view does not 
involve a morally lax view of discriminatory acts performed in our 
actual circumstances—circumstances in which formal and substantive 
discrimination do not maximize moral value. 
To evaluate the allegation of implausibility properly, we need to 
consider it in more detail.  Let us focus on formal discrimination, since 
many people view this as even more wrong than substantive discrimination.  
Suppose that sexist laws forbidding women to do certain kinds of work 
are required to maximize value.  Several reasons could explain this 
requirement: (1) because in the absence of these laws people would be 
less deserving and, hence, benefits to them would count for less, morally 
speaking; or (2) because in the absence of these laws people would 
benefit less.  Those who would not be willing to harm women to secure 
nonsexist laws would not be bothered by at least some versions of the 
first scenario.53
Things might be different if men are better off than women and 
women will benefit only marginally from sexually nondiscriminatory 
laws, whereas men will lose a lot.  If men are better off than women, 
their losses will have to exceed the gains of women to outweigh the 
latter on the prioritarian approach.  If men are worse off than women, it 
may not seem so counterintuitive that for some size of benefits to men, 
and for some size of loss to women, formally discriminatory laws might 
be morally permissible.  To insist that this implication is implausible, it 
seems that one would have to subscribe to an absolute deontological 
constraint against discrimination, and most observers rightly consider 
absolute deontological constraints implausible.54  In fact, the situation 
would be akin to our own situation in which many of us favor efficient, 
 52. This conversational implicature is thought to hold because the most obvious 
explanation of why something is always morally wrong is that the moral reasons by 
virtue of which the act is morally wrong are infinitely strong. 
 53. Cf. Richard J. Arneson, Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity, 93 PHIL. 
STUD. 77, 77-93 (1999). 
 54. See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 79 (1998). 




sexually discriminatory laws implementing affirmative action in favor of 
women. 
The preceding Parts presented and defended a positive account of the 
circumstances under which private discrimination is wrong.  Since this 
defense is far from conclusive, Part V provides further support for the 
desert-prioritarian account by comparing its merits with those of a 
serious competitor: the respect-based account. 
V.  THE RESPECT-BASED ACCOUNT 
According to some, discrimination is morally wrong because it 
involves a failure to respect discriminatees.55  An act or practice fails to 
respect an individual if and only if it involves an underestimation of that 
individual’s moral status.  The act or practice might directly represent 
the individual as having a lower moral status than he actually has, or it 
might inaccurately represent others as having a higher moral status.56  An 
individual’s moral status is roughly determined by the moral weight 
given to his interests.  On the plausible assumption that failures to 
respect do not necessarily overlap with failures to maximize moral 
value, the respect-based account and the desert-prioritarian account will 
in some cases deliver different moral verdicts.57  Notably, on the respect-
based account, discrimination may be morally wrong even if it harms no 
one and does not reduce anyone’s level of desert. 
Like the desert-prioritarian account, the respect-based account is really 
a family of accounts.  Its adherents may differ, for instance, over the 
properties by virtue of which we merit respect and over when an act or a 
practice presupposes that someone has a lower moral status.  On some 
accounts only those properties by virtue of which one qualifies as a 
 55. Absence of respect does not imply disrespect.  For example, in certain 
contexts, such as public transportation, displaying indifference towards another is neither 
respectful nor disrespectful. 
 56. On a different account, “[t]reating a person with respect means . . . dealing 
with him exclusively on the basis of those aspects of his particular character or 
circumstances that are actually relevant to the issue at hand.”  Harry Frankfurt, Equality 
and Respect, 64 SOC. RES. 3, 8 (1997).  On this account, respect is essentially 
nonrelational.  Hence, if discrimination is wrong because it involves a failure to respect 
in this sense, discriminatory acts may be wrong for the same reason as nondiscriminatory 
acts that involve treating people equally, but on the basis of equally irrelevant properties.  
On the account explored here, if failing to respect an individual is to treat him as if he 
has a lower moral status than he in fact has, then the concern for respect is also 
nonrelational.  The basic reason why it is morally bad to treat one person as if he has a 
lower moral status than another, when in fact they have the same moral status, is that one 
treats at least one of them as if he has a moral status different from the one he in fact has.  
It is only derivatively morally bad that one treats them differently. 
 57. If the harms are losses of well-being, it seems plausible to think that not all 
failures to show respect involve harm. 
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person are properties by virtue of which one merits respect.  On this 
view, discrimination against human beings not qualifying as persons 
(perhaps newborn infants or people in late stages of Alzheimer’s) is not 
morally wrong for the same reasons as discrimination against human 
beings who do qualify as persons and thus merit respect. 
The respect account is often embedded in a Kantian moral framework 
which involves an agent-centered duty to avoid disrespecting other 
persons; but in principle consequentialist theories can incorporate 
concern for disrespect by treating respect as a maxim.58  The following 
challenges to respect-based accounts are neutral as between these two 
kinds of respect-based account. 
Respect-based accounts may appear ill-equipped to explain the 
badness of several of the forms of private discrimination identified above.  
First, it seems possible to be a cognitive discriminator even if you have 
no beliefs about the moral status of those you are discriminating against, 
and it is not clear how the mere biased formation of a belief presupposes 
anything about the moral status of the individuals represented in one’s 
beliefs.  In fact, it is even possible, albeit psychologically extraordinary, 
to be firmly convinced that individuals belonging to a group have a 
higher moral status than they in fact have and yet, in some contexts, be 
involved in cognitive discrimination against them. Second, non-valuational 
discrimination simply involves brute desires and hence need not rest on 
any value judgments about moral status. 
To steer around these problems one should focus on the case in which 
the respect-based approach to the wrongness of private discrimination is 
most plausible: valuational, noncognitive discrimination.59  It might be 
argued that this species of discrimination marks a crucial difference 
between respect-based accounts and desert-prioritarianism, since on the 
former it is necessarily morally wrong, while it only tends to be morally 
wrong on the latter.  A closer look at the carefully elaborated respect-
based account proposed by Larry Alexander helps respond to this 
suggestion.60
According to Alexander, most forms of discrimination are wrong, 
when they are, for consequentialist reasons.61  However, he thinks one 
 58. See DAVID CUMMISKEY, KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM 124-27 (1996). 
 59. For a description of valuational, noncognitive discrimination, see supra Part 
II.D. 
 60. See Alexander, supra note 4. 
 61. See id. at 151. 




species of discrimination is wrong for a different reason: differential 
treatment of the members of different groups that manifests a judgment 
of differential moral worth.  Here, Alexander submits, the consequentialist 
account must be supplemented by a respect-based account.  While I find 
myself in agreement with most of Alexander’s treatment of the issue of 
discrimination, I find I am disinclined to follow him at this point. 
Alexander’s notion of moral worth is a specific kind of what may be 
labeled “moral status.”  Why is this kind of discrimination morally wrong?  
Alexander’s article suggests three answers.  First, he writes: “[B]iases 
premised on the belief that some types of people are morally worthier 
than others are intrinsically morally wrong because they reflect incorrect 
moral judgments.”62  On this view, the fact that the bias reflects a false 
moral judgment explains why it is morally wrong.  Call this the falsehood 
interpretation.  Second, commenting on Nazi biases: “Their biases were 
intrinsically morally wrong because Jews are clearly not of lesser moral 
worth than Aryans.”63  One might read this passage as specifying 
something that was implicit in the first passage.  It is not the mere fact 
that a bias reflects a false moral judgment that renders it intrinsically 
wrong, but rather the fact that it reflects a false moral judgment about 
comparative worth.64  Call this the comparative falsehood interpretation.  
A third interpretation of Alexander’s view focuses on the occurrence of 
the qualification “clearly” in the excerpt about Nazi biases.  On this 
interpretation, it is not the falsity of a moral judgment about comparative 
moral worth that renders the consequent bias intrinsically morally 
wrong, but the irrationality of this judgment.  The Nazis had available to 
them abundant reasons for thinking that people of different races 
(however defined) have identical moral worth, yet they managed to form 
spectacularly false beliefs about the matter.  Call this the irrational 
comparative falsehood interpretation.  The following analysis assesses 
the strength of Alexander’s position under each of these interpretations. 
 62. Id. at 161; see also id. at 159 (adding that such treatment is morally wrong 
regardless of the gravity of its effects). 
 63. Id. at 158-59. 
 64. This passage could be read in other ways as well.  First, it might be suggested 
that what is morally relevant is that the bias reflects a false moral judgement to the effect 
that some have a lower moral worth than others.  Someone who fails to believe what his 
beliefs entail may falsely judge some to have a higher moral status without judging that 
others have a lower moral status.  This complication is ignored below.  Second, it might 
be suggested that what is morally relevant is that the discriminator’s moral judgement 
favors people of his “own kind” and that the individuals judged to have different moral 
worth in fact have the same moral worth. 
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A.  The Falsehood Account 
According to the falsehood account, valuational discrimination is 
wrong because it is based on a false moral judgment.  This has several 
noteworthy implications.  First, on this account discrimination against 
and discrimination in favor of are morally symmetrical.  Favorable 
treatment based on a false belief that someone has a higher moral worth 
than he has is no more, and no less, based on a false moral judgment 
than unfavorable treatment based on a false belief that someone has a 
lower moral judgment than he has.  Accordingly, the two kinds of 
treatment are wrong for the same reason. 
Second, if X has a positive bias for Y and this is based on his incorrect 
judgment that Y is more worthy than he is, then this is no less wrong 
than if X thought himself to be worthier than Y, since both involve a 
false judgment about moral worthiness.65  So, by way of illustration, it is 
no more wrong for a male sexist to be biased in favor of men, himself 
included, due to his false belief that men are more worthy than women 
than it is for an oppressed woman to be biased in favor of men due to her 
false beliefs that men are more worthy. 
Third, incorrect moral judgments about a person’s moral worth can be 
absolutely or relatively incorrect, or both.  This makes no moral difference 
on the falsehood account.  An individual, X, may incorrectly consider 
himself morally slightly more worthy than Y and at the same time 
consider himself and Y to be morally much more worthy than they are in 
fact.  The falsehood account does not have the resources to explain why 
discrimination based on this false belief is morally less problematic than 
discrimination based on a slight absolute error and a great comparative 
error. 
Evaluation of the falsehood account requires clarification of two 
issues.  First, we need to clarify what it is for treatment of someone to be 
based on a false judgment about moral worth.  One suggestion is that an 
act which is disadvantageous to the target, or believed to be so by the 
agent, can be said to be based on the target’s moral status if and only if 
that moral status is the lowest possible compatible with this treatment’s 
being morally permissible.  Hence, if I treat someone in a way that 
would be morally permissible only if this individual was a nonhuman 
animal, my act is based on the belief that his moral status is lower than it 
is in fact.  Thus, I fail to respect him. 
 65. This and the prior observation are both true of the two other accounts discussed. 




This suggestion should be rejected.  First, it implies that one does not 
treat another person disrespectfully when one acts towards this individual 
in a morally permissible way.  Yet it would seem possible for me to treat 
someone in a way that is morally permissible, but for reasons that make 
my treatment disrespectful.  For example, as a borrower I might punctually 
and despite my dire situation repay someone the tiny sum I owe him 
thereby signaling my contempt for his, let us suppose, unreasonable 
insistence on repayment whatever the circumstances.  Second, because 
of false information I may act impermissibly in treating an individual in 
a certain way and yet have the deepest respect for this individual.  In 
such cases, saying that I fail to treat this individual with respect seems to 
add nothing to the claim that I act impermissibly.  Finally, the account of 
presupposing something about someone’s moral status implies that 
whenever an act is morally impermissible, it is based on a falsehood 
about the discriminatee’s moral status.  However, it also implies that the 
act is not morally wrong by virtue of this basis.  For this to be the case, 
being based on a falsehood about the person’s moral status would have 
to be something other than being morally impermissible.  Yet friends of 
the respect-based account want to say that being based on a falsehood 
about moral worth is different from, and hence something by virtue of 
which, acts are morally impermissible.  Accordingly, an act can be based 
on an assumption about the moral worth of the affected individual if and 
only if this act is somehow motivated by the actor’s judgment of the 
individual’s moral worth.66  On this account, a sufficiently unreflective 
wrongdoer may make no assumptions about the moral status of his 
victims. 
Second, we need to clarify the concept of moral worth and who can 
possess it.  One possibility is that some sentient beings have moral worth 
and the rest have none.  When Kant famously contrasted persons that have 
worth with mere things that only have a price, he had this possibility in 
mind.67  Kant thought that all rational beings have worth by virtue of 
their rationality and that their worth does not vary, say, with varying 
cognitive abilities.  Variations above the threshold of rationality are 
irrelevant to personhood and do not affect moral status.  Although almost all 
adult human beings are persons, not all human beings are persons in the 
relevant moral sense, that is, rational beings who have the capacity for 
 66. Note that one can make a false moral judgement concerning someone’s moral 
status, treat this person as if this person had a lower moral status, and yet not treat this 
person as such because one holds this false moral judgement (it may be causally inert).  
We can leave as undecided whether such an act is based on the relevant incorrect 
judgement about moral worth. 
 67. See IMMANUAL KANT, THE MORAL LAW 113 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge 
Classics 2005) (1785). 
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self-consciousness (fetuses, newborn infants and irreversibly comatose 
people are exceptions; of course, fetuses and newborn infants have the 
potential to become persons).68  Hence, if we tie the wrongness of 
discrimination to a failure to respect, and if this in turn is tied to the 
moral worth of persons, we cannot explain the wrongness of certain 
kinds of discrimination.  Consider, for instance, someone who does not 
disrespect persons whatever their sex, but discriminates against fetuses 
and newborn infants (potential persons) on the basis of sex.  Imagine 
that this person will not perform an abortion when the fetus is male but 
is happy to do so when it is female.69
Another way to think about moral worth is that all sentient beings 
have moral worth, but in varying degrees.  This is likely the sense of 
worth Alexander has in mind.  He explicitly allows for, but does not 
commit himself to, the view that virtuous and deserving persons have a 
greater moral worth than vicious and undeserving persons.70  According 
to most versions of this view, the function that takes us from a given 
degree of virtuousness to a resulting degree of moral worth is continuous, so 
different individuals have different levels of moral worth.  Moreover, 
there is a huge difference between the most deserving (say, Gandhi) and 
the least deserving (say, Hitler). 
With these clarifications in mind, the question becomes whether the 
mere falsity of the judgment of moral worth on which one’s act is based 
renders that act morally wrong.  Consider first a case in which X treats Y 
worse than Z in a way that is impermissible because, through no fault of 
his own, X holds the false belief that Y is very undeserving and Z very 
deserving.  Consider next a case in which X treats Y worse than Z in a 
way that is impermissible because, through no fault of his own, he does 
not falsely believe that Y is very undeserving and Z very deserving.  The 
question then is: do these cases differ, morally speaking, and if so which 
is worst? 
In answering this question we should ignore two confusing factors.  
First, harmful behavior that reflects a judgment of lower moral status is 
often more harmful, other things being equal, than behavior that does not 
 68. See JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF 
LIFE 6 (2002) (“Roughly speaking, to be a person, one must have the capacity for self-
consciousness.”). 
 69. Defenders of a respect-based account are, of course, free to say that this kind 
of discrimination is wrong, not because of any failure to respect the worth of the fetuses, 
but because it is hurtful and thus harmful for some existing persons, in this case women. 
 70. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 159. 
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reflect such judgment, and for that reason it is often morally worse.  This 
is merely a contingent truth and as such does not support Alexander’s 
account.  Second, when we think of cases in which someone misjudges 
the moral worth of others, we tend to have in mind cases involving 
epistemic vice—cases in which the discriminator, for example, applies 
epistemic double-standards in evaluating evidence of moral worth.  Such 
vices, however, should be disregarded; they need to be considered 
instead in relation to the irrational comparative falsehood account. 
Returning to our question, one view is that the two cases do not differ 
morally speaking, since while X’s beliefs about Y’s and Z’s levels of 
desert are relevant to our evaluation of his moral character, they are 
irrelevant to moral evaluation of his act.  This view seems most promising.  
However, for present purposes we can set this aside and note that if X’s 
beliefs about Y’s and Z’s levels of desert are relevant to evaluating his 
act, it would seem that what X does in the second case is worse than 
what he does in the first.  Although X’s actions in the first case were 
wrong, he at least believed (or had beliefs to the effect) that the person 
he treated badly was thoroughly undeserving.  In the second case not 
only were X’s actions wrong, but he also lacked the belief that the person 
he treated disadvantageously was thoroughly undeserving.  If this makes 
any moral difference at all, it suggests that the latter act is worse.  But if 
one’s discriminatory activities are in some cases less bad when 
accompanied by a false judgment about the moral worth of the person 
affected by those activities, it follows that discrimination cannot be bad 
simply because it reflects an incorrect judgment of moral worth.  Hence, 
we should reject this account. 
B.  The Comparative Falsehood Account 
If the argument above shows that we should reject the falsehood 
account, a similar conclusion is sound here.  Comparing a case in which 
X treats Z better than Y and this treatment is based on the false belief that 
Z is more worthy than Y, with a case of differential treatment in which X 
has no such false belief suggests the false belief is either irrelevant to our 
moral evaluation of the acts or reduces the moral badness of the act. 
C.  The Irrational Comparative Falsehood Account 
Now compare a case in which X treats Z better than Y and this 
treatment is based on the false and irrational belief that Z is more 
worthy than Y, with a similar case of differential treatment in which X 
has no such belief.  Is the former morally worse than the latter? 
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One possibility that needs exploration is whether the falsity of the 
judgment of Y and Z’s comparative worth drops out of the picture as 
irrelevant to moral evaluation of differential treatment.  To see what 
motivates such a line of inquiry, consider a case in which the discriminator 
correctly judges the comparative moral worth of Y and Z based on an 
irrational, false moral judgment about the relevance to one’s moral 
worth of membership in the socially salient groups to which Y and Z 
belong.  So suppose a discriminating, sexist agent falsely believes that Y 
is a particularly morally virtuous person—indeed so morally virtuous 
that the discriminator irrationally believes Y, despite being a woman, is 
more worthy than Z, who is a man.  Suppose additionally that Y is in fact 
morally worthier than Z.  Here, we might assume, X makes an irrational, 
but correct judgment about the comparative moral worth of Y and Z.  
From the point of view of respect, this case seems no different from an 
otherwise comparable case in which X does not falsely believe that Y is a 
particularly virtuous person and thus makes a false judgment about Y 
and Z’s comparative moral worth.  This suggests that the falsity of the 
judgment about the comparative worth of Y and Z is in itself irrelevant 
from the point of view of respect.  What matters is the fact that the 
comparative judgment is held irrationally. 
Sheer irrationality seems intrinsically morally irrelevant and, thus, 
cannot explain the moral badness of discrimination.  However, it may be 
different with irrationality tied to moral flaws.71  Assume X irrationally 
believes that Z is more worthy than Y because X has an unjustified hatred 
of Y because of Y’s membership in a certain socially salient group.  It is 
no longer immediately clear what we should say about the moral 
credentials of our two cases of differential treatment.  One possibility is 
to say that the fact that a given differential treatment is based on 
irrational beliefs about differential moral worth, where the irrationality 
involved reflects a moral flaw, renders it intrinsically morally wrong.  
Another possibility is to say that the fact that a given differential 
treatment is so based is irrelevant to the moral evaluation of the activity 
of differential treatment but is highly relevant to the moral (and 
epistemic) evaluation of the character of the agent involved. 
The second of these possibilities allows us to say, in some cases, that 
an agent did what he ought to do, morally speaking, despite his vicious, 
 71. Irrationality may reflect moral virtues.  For example, if you continue believing 
that your friend is telling you the truth, despite evidence to the contrary, you may be a 
better friend than if your view of the matter simply tracked the evidence. 




irrational false beliefs about comparative moral worth.  Suppose a sexist 
male professor denies a female colleague some sabbatical on account of 
his irrational, false beliefs about the differential moral worth of men and 
women.  Suppose, moreover, that unbeknownst to the professor his colleague 
is a thoroughly undeserving person with a long history of misconduct 
and ought, morally speaking, to be denied the sabbatical.  Here we might 
like to say that the professor’s action was morally right; it just happened 
to be based on an irrational and false belief about the differential moral 
status of men and women which, in the circumstances, led to a correct 
judgment about the moral status of the colleague.72  Of course, the 
professor’s motivation displays a flaw of character. 
Having now reviewed all three interpretations, the desert-prioritarian 
account is clearly not inferior to Alexander’s respect-based account.  
This is not to say that respect is irrelevant to the morality of private 
discrimination.  Perceived lack of respect often affects the degree of 
harm involved in differential treatment, the desert level of individuals, 
and thus the moral qualities of discriminatory acts.73  Again, lack of 
respect is relevant to the moral evaluation of a person’s character or 
motivation.  Both of these observations are, however, consistent with the 
desert-prioritarian account. 
VI.  THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN WRONGFUL PRIVATE               
DISCRIMINATION: A CONCEPTUAL MAP 
There is a right to engage in private discrimination if and only if it is 
not the case that there ought, morally speaking, to be a law that prohibits 
engaging in such activities.74  To determine the conditions under which 
there ought to be such a law, we return to desert-accommodating 
 72. Hence, here we have a case of a bias based on a correct judgment of 
differential worth that, however, in turn is based on an incorrect judgment of differential 
worth.  Alexander’s account implies that a bias is wrong, not just if it is immediately 
grounded in a false judgment of differential worth, but also if any link in the chain of 
grounding beliefs of a bias involves an incorrect judgment of differential moral worth.  
See Alexander, supra note 4, at 217-18. 
 73. Accordingly, the desert-prioritarian account is compatible with cases where 
“doing X” has a different moral status than “doing X with the intention of Y,” “doing X 
out of motive Z,” and “doing X thereby expressing an attitude of W.”  The latter cases 
may have different consequences than the former.  See Arneson’s discussion of thin 
versus thick act descriptions.  Richard Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 775, 779-86 (2006). 
 74. This ignores cases in which a law forbidding a certain kind of private 
discrimination is neither one that ought, morally speaking, to exist, nor one that ought 
not to exist—either will have exactly equally good consequences—and the law must 
either forbid or permit the behavior.  If, in such a case, we decide to forbid the relevant 
kind of private discrimination, there is no right to private discrimination even if the 
condition stated in the main text is not satisfied.  I owe this point to Peter Vallentyne. 
LIPPERT-LIPPERT RASMUSSEN_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 2/26/2007  11:33:33 AM 
[VOL. 43:  817, 2006]  Private Discrimination 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 851 
prioritarianism; other moral principles will lead to different conclusions 
about which kinds of discrimination ought to be legally forbidden.  
Desert-prioritarianism implies that there ought to be a law prohibiting a 
certain kind of wrongful private discrimination if and only if that law 
maximizes moral value.  In fact, on this view there ought to be a law that 
enjoins private discrimination that is morally wrong if the existence of 
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The world we live in may well instantiate all six possibilities—some 
more often than others.  The examples below describe some considerations 
relevant to the classification of different cases.  Before doing so, one 
issue must be briefly addressed: how we determine which alternatives 
are relevant to determining which laws maximize moral value.75
Laws that maximize moral value in one set of alternatives may be very 
different from those that maximize moral value in another.  Assume, for 
instance, that in one alternative people engage in neither morally wrong 
discrimination nor other kinds of unjust behavior and most private 
 
 75. One question here is whether one should use the same range of alternatives for 
the purpose of determining which kinds of private discrimination are wrongful and for 
the purpose of determining which kinds of private discrimination ought to be legal.  
Using different sets of alternatives may render it too easy to find examples of wrongful 
private discrimination that ought to be legal and examples of morally permissible private 
discrimination that ought to be illegal. 
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discrimination is legal.  That alternative might well realize greater moral 
value than one in which most people engage in various kinds of morally 
wrong private discrimination and most kinds of private discrimination 
are illegal.  Equally, it might realize greater moral value than an alternative 
in which people engage in neither morally wrong private discrimination 
nor other kinds of unjust behavior and most kinds of private discrimination 
are illegal (say, because of the costs involved in having laws that are 
never transgressed).  This might show that in a world that is pretty ideal 
from the point of view of nondiscrimination there ought to be a right to 
engage in wrongful private discrimination; but it would not show that, 
given the non-ideal worlds that we could realistically hope to maintain, 
there ought to be a legal right to engage in such behavior.  To properly 
explain which kinds of wrongful private discrimination ought to be 
legal, one must specify the full range of alternatives relative to which 
one answers the question.  This undertaking is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Hence, the following examples assume that the relative alternatives 
will parallel ours, in terms of people’s dispositions to behave in certain 
ways, but will have different laws on private discrimination.  The 
evaluation of these alternatives will be rough, sketchy, and done from 
the armchair.  At best, it identifies some considerations that will be 
relevant to the issue. 
A.  Alternative 1: A Legal Duty to Engage in Wrongful                            
Private Discrimination 
In cases involving widespread biases, it might emerge that there ought 
to be a legal duty to engage in wrongful private discrimination.  
Consider a country whose population is divided into a large Protestant 
majority and a small Catholic minority.  Some members of the Protestant 
elite are anti-Catholic, and as a result there are certain laws which, in 
effect, impose on Protestants a legal duty to engage in private discrimination 
against Catholics.  For instance, Protestants are not allowed to hire or live 
together with Catholics.  Members of the Protestant elite and Protestants 
generally care about these discriminatory laws mainly as a symbolic 
manifestation of Protestant supremacy.  Hence, Protestants and Catholics 
who engage in the legally forbidden private interaction experience little 
trouble: few inform on lawbreakers, the police give low priority to 
violations of these discriminatory laws, and only a few lawbreakers 
experience social sanctions. 
Generally speaking, it is morally wrong for Protestants to discriminate 
in the ways they are legally obliged to discriminate.  However, trying to 
change the laws would cause an uproar, possibly civil war, and hence the 
laws, morally speaking, ought to be retained for the time being.  More 
LIPPERT-LIPPERT RASMUSSEN_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC 2/26/2007  11:33:33 AM 
[VOL. 43:  817, 2006]  Private Discrimination 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 853 
 
generally, in cases involving widespread biases that focus mainly on the 
symbolic significance of discriminatory laws, a gap between legally 
required and morally permissible discriminatory acts may develop.  Such 
situations are normally best construed as partial compliance situations 
that are not optimal from the point of view of nondiscrimination. 
B.  Alternative 2: A Legal Right to Engage in Wrongful                         
Private Discrimination 
There are plenty of discriminatory acts that are wrongful and yet ought 
to be legally permitted.  First, some wrongful private discriminatory acts 
are likely to be so rare that little good will come from outlawing them.  
For a wide range of commodities people will purchase whatever is the 
best offer from a purely commercial point of view.  Hence, if some 
consumers will not buy petrol produced by companies that predominantly 
employ people of a certain ethnicity, they might act in a wrongful way 
and yet denying them a legal right to do so might not, given the rarity of 
this behavior, improve the situation.76
Second, in connection with some kinds of wrongful private discrimination, 
enforcement of the laws would be very difficult and costly.  For instance, 
people who discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, and religion in 
their choice of spouse may act wrongly, especially in situations of racial, 
ethnic, or religious tension.  But often it will be difficult, and harmful to 
many parties, to prove that someone has discriminated in his or her 
choice of spouse. 
Third, as the example just provided illustrates, effective law enforcement 
may destroy some important goods altogether.  The law can force a 
company to hire a higher proportion of its workforce with a minority 
background without seriously affecting, for better or worse, its economic 
viability; but a person cannot be forced by law to marry a person with a 
race, religion, or ethnicity different from his own without seriously 
affecting his love life.77  (Imagine: “This court finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that had you not been such a bigot, you would have married Y 
rather than your present spouse, Z.”) 
 76. Jobs and services may differ from many commodities, in that these involve a 
much greater density of social interactions.  See NARVESON, Have We a Right to 
Nondiscrimination?, supra note 5, at 213. 
 77. The state might through indirect and non-legal means try to reduce the amount 
of private discrimination of this sort. 




In these cases, laws cannot create a state of affairs that is ideal from 
the point of view of nondiscrimination.  This requires a certain kind of 
ethos manifested in people’s lawful choices. 
C.  Alternative 3: A Legal Duty Not to Engage in Wrongful                     
Private Discrimination 
The claim that this case is instantiated is much less controversial, and 
very little shall be said about it.  For instance, there ought to be laws 
forbidding private employers from paying women less than men for 
doing the same job when these are easily enforced at little cost and with 
little harm to employers, female employees, or consumers.  One highly 
relevant factor is the way in which laws will affect the strength and 
existence of the relevant discriminatory preferences.  When discriminatory 
preferences are a rather superficial feature of people’s identity, outlawing 
conduct reflecting such preferences may make them almost extinct, 
strengthening the argument for outlawing the relevant conduct.78
D.  Alternatives 4 & 5: A Legal Duty or Permission to Engage               
in Private Discrimination that Is Not Wrongful 
Affirmative action programs will often be of this kind.  Consider first 
the case for a legal duty.  Suppose a certain minority has suffered from 
very bad forms of discrimination and other injustices.  Suppose that as a 
result people from this minority suffer from substandard levels of 
education and income.  Suppose, finally, that affirmative action programs at 
private universities and companies will either not make things worse or 
make them considerably better from the point of view of desert-
accommodating prioritarianism—because they redistribute resources to 
badly-off people who are in some cases more deserving, and because 
they lead to a society with less discrimination that makes better use of 
the pool of talent.  In the latter case where affirmative action programs at 
private universities and companies make things considerably better from 
the point of view of desert-accommodating prioritarianism, a legal duty 
to engage in affirmative action might be justified because it ensures that 
more private universities and companies engage in affirmative action.  In 
the former case where affirmative action programs at private universities 
and companies simply do not make things worse from the point of view 
of desert-accommodating prioritarianism, a legal duty might be justified 
because it sends a powerful message of inclusion which may have 
 78. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 163. 
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positive consequences quite independently of the consequences resulting 
from various agents’ efforts to comply with the law. 
There may be cases in which (i) the net benefits from universities and 
companies adopting affirmative action programs in response to a legal 
requirement are negative; and (ii) where a mere legal permission to 
adopt such programs will involve roughly the same symbolic benefits as 
a legal requirement.  Equally, there may be cases in which (i) these symbolic 
benefits of legal permission will be smaller than the symbolic benefits of 
a legal duty; but (ii) there is a somewhat greater net loss involved in 
having some companies and universities adopting affirmative action 
programs that they would not have adopted had the law not forced them 
to do so.  In both situations, desert-accommodating prioritarianism favors 
legal permission to engage in affirmative action over a legal duty to do 
so. 
E.  Alternative 6: A Legal Duty Not to Engage in Private  
Discrimination that Is Not Wrongful 
Consider, finally, the case of a community that is prone to ethnic and 
religious tension.  In cases involving disaster relief, people prefer to 
donate money to aid agencies providing assistance to people with the 
same religion and the same ethnic background as themselves.  Partly as a 
result of this, only sectarian aid agencies exist.  Suppose that each act of 
discriminatory donation brings about more moral value than would be 
brought about by not donating and, hence, is not wrongful.79  It may 
nevertheless be the case that there ought to be law prohibiting discriminatory 
donations.  The pattern of sectarian donations might be such as to fuel 
ethnic and religious tension considerably.  If this were so, a nonsectarian 
pattern of private donations would be a collective good from the point of 
view of all donors.  Alternatively, legal enforcement of a pattern of 
nonsectarian donation might not appreciably reduce the total sum of 
donations. 
These observations strongly suggest that, for the desert-accommodating 
prioritarian, the wrongfulness of private discrimination where it arises 
should not, morally speaking, always be tracked by unlawfulness.  That 
is, cases can be described in which there should be a legal right to 
engage in private discrimination even though that discrimination is 
 79. The sets of sectarian donations may well be wrongful then, but I disregard this 
complication. 
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morally wrong; and other cases can be described in which there should 
be a legal duty to avoid private discrimination even though that 
discrimination is not morally wrong.  In these respects, wrongful private 
discrimination is no different from other kinds of wrongful behavior; and 
while some moral theories may not allow such gaps between the moral 
status and the morally desirable legal status of discrimination, desert-
accommodating prioritarianism is not alone in allowing such a gap. 
 
